jakke

May 01 2012 ∞

so Greece is having an election this weekend!

Incredibly frustratingly, there’s a blackout on the publication of the poll results for the two weeks before the election, and the twelve polls released in the three days leading up to the blackout were all over the place.ND (the mainstream centre-right party) is almost definitely in first place and PASOK (the mainstream centre-left party) is almost definitely in second place. Beyond that, though, no idea what’s happening. There could be as many as ten or eleven parties getting seats in the legislature. And obviously there could be substantial movement in the last couple weeks - probably not enough to knock ND out of first place, though. (The first-place party gets an automatic 50-seat bonus, while the other 250 seats are distributed proportionally - so coming in first is a big deal.) What can we expect from the Greek election?

Basically, the Greek parliamentary system goes through a series of contingencies. If one fails they move onto the next one. Here’s the whole process, with (totally estimated and probably not accurate percentages) to give some indication of how likely things are to proceed to each stage:

Does any party have a majority? (100%, since this is the first stage)

If so, perfect! Problem solved. This is incredibly unlikely, though - even with the fifty-seat top-up.

Can the largest party form a viable coalition? (95%)

If the largest party doesn’t have 151 seats even after its fifty-seat bonus, the President gives the largest party a chance to form a coalition. (The President is a figurehead with no governing role except in extraordinary circumstances; Canadians can think of this as basically equivalent to the Governor-General.) It the largest party is ND, then they and PASOK will likely form a coalition to soft-pedal the populace on continued austerity compliance. This would be exactly the same coalition that’s currently in power before the election.

Can the second-largest party form a viable coalition? (40%)

If the largest party (which, remember, got a fifty-seat bonus) can’t form a coalition, then the second-place party gets a chance. If this is PASOK, then there’s very little chance they can form a majority coalition, because they’re basically the party of the austerity program. If it’s someone else like the Coalition of the Radical Left or the populist (right-wing nationalist) Independent Greeks then maybe they could put together some kind of cross-ideology anti-austerity coalition government. Note that the Communists refuse to join any coalition of any kind and they will probably get around 10% of the seats which means a successful second-place majority coalition would have to include basically everyone except the first-place party and the Communists.

Can the third-largest party form a viable coalition? (35%)

If the two biggest parties can’t form a majority coalition government, then the third-place party gets to take a crack at things! This like giving all the king’s horses a chance to reassemble Humpty Dumpty - done out of tradition, but incredibly unlikely to be effective.

Okay, time to try the whole election thing again. (34%)

If the third-biggest party can’t form a viable majority government, then a top judge gets appointed as a caretaker Prime Minister just long enough to arrange another set of elections. This has happened once before, and it went pretty smoothly. Hopefully the caretaker administration can resist potential pressure from the EU to suspend elections indefinitely to implement an austerity program, because without elected legitimacy the government would almost certainly face widespread violent protests. (Which it could probably withstand. Greece has a huge military for its size. But we don’t want things getting there.)

Not really sure how things would proceed after this point. I mean, if you hold a new election, and he results are equally unstable, then what do you do? Almost certainly there would be changes to the electoral law to make it harder for small parties to enter government, and then they’d run yet another election. By this point it would likely be well into the fall and the Greek government would almost certainly have lost the financial ability to provide basic services. So yeah„ hopefully things do not get this far.

7 notes

Feb 28 2012 ∞
politicalprof: The times they have a’changed. It so happens that I am in agreement with the [anti-racial segregation] objectives of the Supreme Court as stated in the Brown decision. I am not prepared, however, to impose that judgment of mine on the people of Mississippi or South Carolina… That is their business, not mine. I believe that the problem of race relations, like all social and cultural problems, is best handled by the people directly concerned… [and] should not be effected by engines of national power. So there’s Barry Goldwater supporting segregation in the South. Lest this quote make it seem like he was some towering figure of civil rights, or something.

politicalprof:

The times they have a’changed.

It so happens that I am in agreement with the [anti-racial segregation] objectives of the Supreme Court as stated in the Brown decision. I am not prepared, however, to impose that judgment of mine on the people of Mississippi or South Carolina… That is their business, not mine. I believe that the problem of race relations, like all social and cultural problems, is best handled by the people directly concerned… [and] should not be effected by engines of national power.

So there’s Barry Goldwater supporting segregation in the South. Lest this quote make it seem like he was some towering figure of civil rights, or something.

(via sarahlee310)

1,332 notes

Feb 24 2012 ∞

here's the Greek government's formal solicitation of private sector debt swap

They just released this a couple hours ago, which is late Friday evening in Greece. I guess the idea is to give investors some time to figure things out before trading opens Monday morning?

It’s a really dry document, but here are some highlights:

  • Investors will be given three choices of bonds to swap their existing bonds for. All of them mean pretty heavy losses for investors. The safest one (backed by the eurozone’s new European Financial Stability Facility) means that investors take a hit of 85% on their investment value.
  • If at least 90% of investors agree, then the deal goes through for sure (and presumably the Greek government forces the rest to participate). If at least 75% of the investors agree, then the Greek government has the option of making the deal go through. If less than 75% of investors participate, then that’s really suboptimal.
  • If the Greek government needs to force the deal through, this will almost certainly trigger billions of dollars’ worth of credit default swaps, which are effectively insurance on default. It’s not clear if the banks backing those swaps (i.e. promising to pay out the default insurance) have those billions of dollars on hand.

If the banks backing the swaps don’t have the billions of dollars available, then that’s going to be a problem as they’re going to need to sell a lot of assets very quickly to pay out. This would likely trigger some issues in financial markets, but probably not to the point where governments would need to step in and bail out the banks who need to pay out.

Anyway, will be interesting to see how this goes. The Greek government is setting up a website to communicate more information about the process at greekbonds.gr, which seems like the sort of URL a banner ad might point to but it redirects to a very legit-looking government webpage.

4 notes

Feb 12 2012 ∞
So the Greek legislature is currently voting on whether to accept some really harsh cuts to government spending and labour protection in exchange for the German government holding a vote on whether to give them more bailout money and private lenders agreeing to write off much of the debt the Greek government owes them. The vote seems slightly more likely to succeed than to fail, but it might be close. The two big parties control around 240 of the 300 seats in the legislature, so they can handle some dissent but not widespread backbench revolt. And if this vote fails, Greece effectively enters a state of disorganized default, effectively immediately. Moreover, even if it succeeds, the German government and other eurozone governments are really skeptical whether the vote actually amounts to any substantive policy changes. If the German government doesn’t think the measures being voted on will actually get implemented, then they won’t approve their (very large) share of the eurozone bailout, which will almost certainly trigger default in Greece. And in the meantime Athens is a total shitshow, as is demonstrated in that picture above. Estimates are between 100,000 and 500,000 rioters, at least ten buildings have been set on fire, and lots of people are going to hospital. People are absolutely furious at these cuts, and so it’s not clear how much scope the government will have to implement them while maintaining political stability. Moreover, there’s an election in just over a month, and it seems increasingly likely that the new government will need to include at least one party which is dead-set on reversing all the measures passed today. The rest of the eurozone and all the banks can press as hard as they want, and whatever Greek government officials can make all kinds of soothing statements, but if people feel their social contract with the government is being violated then these current austerity measures are not going to be sustainable.  (The image comes from this Globe and Mail article on the vote, which I don’t really like because it makes it seem like all that needs to happen is that the current legislature approve the cuts and then everything will be magically fixed. But you should follow the Globe and Mail’s Athens reporter’s Twitter feed here if you want quick updates on what’s happening.)

So the Greek legislature is currently voting on whether to accept some really harsh cuts to government spending and labour protection in exchange for the German government holding a vote on whether to give them more bailout money and private lenders agreeing to write off much of the debt the Greek government owes them. The vote seems slightly more likely to succeed than to fail, but it might be close. The two big parties control around 240 of the 300 seats in the legislature, so they can handle some dissent but not widespread backbench revolt. And if this vote fails, Greece effectively enters a state of disorganized default, effectively immediately.

Moreover, even if it succeeds, the German government and other eurozone governments are really skeptical whether the vote actually amounts to any substantive policy changes. If the German government doesn’t think the measures being voted on will actually get implemented, then they won’t approve their (very large) share of the eurozone bailout, which will almost certainly trigger default in Greece.

And in the meantime Athens is a total shitshow, as is demonstrated in that picture above. Estimates are between 100,000 and 500,000 rioters, at least ten buildings have been set on fire, and lots of people are going to hospital. People are absolutely furious at these cuts, and so it’s not clear how much scope the government will have to implement them while maintaining political stability. Moreover, there’s an election in just over a month, and it seems increasingly likely that the new government will need to include at least one party which is dead-set on reversing all the measures passed today. The rest of the eurozone and all the banks can press as hard as they want, and whatever Greek government officials can make all kinds of soothing statements, but if people feel their social contract with the government is being violated then these current austerity measures are not going to be sustainable. 

(The image comes from this Globe and Mail article on the vote, which I don’t really like because it makes it seem like all that needs to happen is that the current legislature approve the cuts and then everything will be magically fixed. But you should follow the Globe and Mail’s Athens reporter’s Twitter feed here if you want quick updates on what’s happening.)

6 notes

Feb 10 2012 ∞
So the Greek cabinet has finally reached a deal on austerity measures required to get their next bailout and negotiate a debt reduction! These measures are really harsh (e.g., a 22% cut to minimum wage) and also it still has to be approved by the legislature as a whole, which might be trickier. In the meantime, the German government (who are paying for a big part of this next bailout) has gotten much less shy about threatening to leave the Greek government to the wolves without some drastic and credible action on government finances, and Greece is seeing another 48-hour general strike. In light of all this I figure it’s productive to consider how things could play out from here. (I realize I’ve made this kind of post before, but things have changed in Greece - especially with the technocrat government and upcoming elections.) All these probabilities are totally subjective, obviously. Implement austerity to orderly default (31%) This is looking like the most likely option right now - the rest of the eurozone imposes really harsh conditions, Greek citizens continue to suffer, the debt reduction is insufficient, and then eventually they just give up on trying to pay their debt. This would almost certainly mean leaving the eurozone (but not the EU). Installation of EU overseer (10%) This is probably going to be mandatory if the Greek government needs another bailout. Germany, the Netherlands, and other rich eurozone countries will require that the Greek government turn over budgetary veto power to an EU-appointed oversight agency. This would  be a serious loss of sovereignty and would likely lead to widespread political violence. Failure to close agreement; disorderly default (25%) This current series of negotiations has to wrap up by Monday or so. If that doesn’t happen, Greece defaults. Expect bank failures in Europe and almost certainly Greek expulsion from the eurozone. If credit default swaps trigger a worldwide selloff, there will certainly be another 2008-style crash and recession. Reneging after election; disorderly default (22%) This is getting more and more likely. Whatever government ends up in power after the Greek elections on 20 April could just repudiate the deal and reverse the austerity changes. There are politicians promising to do exactly that. Obviously the rest of the eurozone would be furious - but what can they do, invade? Banks, hotel chains, manufacturers, and other multinationals would all pull out en masse to avoid likely EU sanctions. A global financial crash is likely here too. Failed election; disorderly default (2%) This one is also growing in probability. There are seven parties with a real national presence in this election, and it’s not clear that they can form any kind of stable coalition. Also, political violence is getting bad as people see increasing hardship with no benefits. It’s hard to predict what this would look like, but Greece would likely leave the eurozone. Note that under none of these scenarios does Greece return to full functionality in the next five years or so. With no jobs and no growth and massive government spending cuts there’s no way that the government can get things back in order in the near future. At this point, this whole exercise is more or less just about trying to mitigate contagion to financial markets and ensuring that eurozone governments get paid. (The image above is from this slideshow of the most recent 48-hour strike. Heads up: it shows some nontrivial police brutality.)

So the Greek cabinet has finally reached a deal on austerity measures required to get their next bailout and negotiate a debt reduction! These measures are really harsh (e.g., a 22% cut to minimum wage) and also it still has to be approved by the legislature as a whole, which might be trickier. In the meantime, the German government (who are paying for a big part of this next bailout) has gotten much less shy about threatening to leave the Greek government to the wolves without some drastic and credible action on government finances, and Greece is seeing another 48-hour general strike.

In light of all this I figure it’s productive to consider how things could play out from here. (I realize I’ve made this kind of post before, but things have changed in Greece - especially with the technocrat government and upcoming elections.) All these probabilities are totally subjective, obviously.

Implement austerity to orderly default (31%)

This is looking like the most likely option right now - the rest of the eurozone imposes really harsh conditions, Greek citizens continue to suffer, the debt reduction is insufficient, and then eventually they just give up on trying to pay their debt. This would almost certainly mean leaving the eurozone (but not the EU).

Installation of EU overseer (10%)

This is probably going to be mandatory if the Greek government needs another bailout. Germany, the Netherlands, and other rich eurozone countries will require that the Greek government turn over budgetary veto power to an EU-appointed oversight agency. This would  be a serious loss of sovereignty and would likely lead to widespread political violence.

Failure to close agreement; disorderly default (25%)

This current series of negotiations has to wrap up by Monday or so. If that doesn’t happen, Greece defaults. Expect bank failures in Europe and almost certainly Greek expulsion from the eurozone. If credit default swaps trigger a worldwide selloff, there will certainly be another 2008-style crash and recession.

Reneging after election; disorderly default (22%)

This is getting more and more likely. Whatever government ends up in power after the Greek elections on 20 April could just repudiate the deal and reverse the austerity changes. There are politicians promising to do exactly that. Obviously the rest of the eurozone would be furious - but what can they do, invade? Banks, hotel chains, manufacturers, and other multinationals would all pull out en masse to avoid likely EU sanctions. A global financial crash is likely here too.

Failed election; disorderly default (2%)

This one is also growing in probability. There are seven parties with a real national presence in this election, and it’s not clear that they can form any kind of stable coalition. Also, political violence is getting bad as people see increasing hardship with no benefits. It’s hard to predict what this would look like, but Greece would likely leave the eurozone.

Note that under none of these scenarios does Greece return to full functionality in the next five years or so. With no jobs and no growth and massive government spending cuts there’s no way that the government can get things back in order in the near future. At this point, this whole exercise is more or less just about trying to mitigate contagion to financial markets and ensuring that eurozone governments get paid.

(The image above is from this slideshow of the most recent 48-hour strike. Heads up: it shows some nontrivial police brutality.)

56 notes

Jan 03 2012 ∞

Seeing as the diverse and representative voters of Iowa get to pick the next Republican candidate for US President today, I figured it was a reasonable time to update the national uniform swing projections.

As always, these predict the election by taking national-level polling data, assuming that any shift in party support from the 2008 election comes from a uniform shift everywhere in the country, and using this information and the polling margin of error to generate win probabilities. The colours on the map indicate the probability of the win, not the expected vote share - because getting 50%+1 of the votes generally means a win. (Except in Nebraska and Maine. Which I’ve accounted for here.) You can see the predictions from two weeks ago here, for comparison.

This time I’ve added a fourth map, which tries to predict what happens if Ron Paul runs as a third-party candidate against Romney and Obama. (This honestly seems pretty likely to me, especially if he’s still polling well late into the spring.) Under the national uniform swing assumption, it’s obviously pretty difficult for Paul to win any seats whatsoever, but the national uniform swing assumption might not be too accurate.

Anyway, you can and should click through to see the full-sized maps - but for now, here are some highlights:

  • The race between Romney and Obama would be close to a tossup, and Romney would actually be a very narrow favourite to win the popular vote. However, much of this popular vote advantage would get wasted by winning the states he won by a landslide, while Obama would be winning his states by a narrower margin - so, advantage Obama. Any slight deviation towards Romney from national uniform swing in half a dozen states would make Romney the favoured candidate. 
  • Not only is Romney really competitive against Obama, but he’s basically the only candidate who is competitive against Obama. Paul has basically no chance of winning, and Gingrich is even worse. At this point it’s difficult to keep making the excuse that voters just don’t know enough about Gingrich or Paul, because they’ve both had heaps of media coverage. (And to be realistic - neither is a candidate that becomes more appealing with increased scrutiny.)
  • In a three-way matchup, Obama has such a clear advantage that it wouldn’t even be sporting anymore. He’d be competitive in states like Montana and Georgia. For all the talk of Paul attracting Democratic and independent voters during the primary season, virtually everyone who says they’d vote for him in a three-way election comes from the Republican Party. This actually makes sense, because honestly his positions on abortion, taxes, gun control, and other core Republican issues are entirely within the party mainstream, and the vast majority of voters really don’t care about the Federal Reserve or whatever.

Anyway, obviously all of this can change hugely, because the actual election isn’t for another ten months. But if Romney starts winning Iowa, New Hampshire, and so on, then Democrat types should start getting very worried that this is going to be a really contentious election.

36 notes

Dec 21 2011 ∞

Here are some updated national uniform swing predictions. You’ll definitely want to click on those maps to enlarge.

National uniform swing means taking national-level polling data, and then assuming that any shifts at the national level are happening uniformly across all states, and then using this to predict the election. I use the margin of error on the polls to generate margins of error here. The colours on this map represent the probability of Obama or the Republican nominee winning, not the vote shares - because even if Obama is getting 50% + 1 votes in a given state, he’s still winning that state’s electoral votes. (Except Nebraska and Maine. More on that later.)

These predictions are drawn from the last two weeks of national polling, which has included fifteen polls with at least one of these three candidates from nine different polling agencies. It accounts for the new district allocations from the most recent census, as well as the electoral college allocation systems used in Nebraska and Maine. (The only individual district that was particularly competitive was Nebraska’s 2nd, which Obama won last time. Due to redistricting, I wouldn’t take the district-by-district predictions seriously, though.)

Note that of these three candidates only Romney is even possibly competitive, and even then Obama has a big advantage unless Romney starts winning additional Midwestern states. Even though Newt Gingrich gets the serious-thinker treatment while Ron Paul gets the conspiracy-theorist treatment, Gingrich does substantially worse than Paul. Given current polling, it is virtually impossible for Gingrich to win. He’d have to start polling ahead in states like Pennsylvania or Ohio while not losing ground in Georgia or Montana. A Gingrich nomination for the Republicans would basically guarantee an Obama win, even more so than a Paul nomination.

Obviously, all of this could change. The election is still ten and a half months away, and campaigning, economic conditions, foreign affairs, and voters’ increasing knowledge about the candidates all make a big difference. But right now, I can’t see any way that Gingrich could possibly become President.

41 notes

Dec 19 2011 ∞
Okay so America’s favourite charming stoner racist great-uncle is apparently leading in Iowa, according to Public Policy Polling. While obviously it’s not productive to read too much into any individual poll, PPP polls extensively in Iowa, and in the past they’ve produced excellent results, and these shifts in poll results (especially the drop for Gingrich) are hugely statistically significant. I’m guessing the drop for Gingrich comes from the fact that as primary voters learn more about him (and his multiplicity of wives) they are less impressed by his ability to return the United States to some mythical glorious pre-Mad Man era patriarchal Christian paradise. This has kind of been a pretty steady pattern throughout the campaign process: voters identify a candidate who seems promisingly conservative and personable, they learn more about the candidate’s past and priorities through increased media scrutiny, and they realize the candidate is undesirable. It’s happened for Bachmann, Perry, Cain, and now Gingrich. Anyway, apparently they’re going through the same process for Paul, at least in Iowa. Media coverage of the Paul campaign tends to depict it as some kind of wacky sideshow, but his local-level campaigning has apparently been really effective in Iowa. I think when he focuses on restricting abortions, removing restrictions on gun ownership, and removing social spending, it makes him really attractive to Republican primary voters - as they’re probably more motivated by these issues than esoteric concerns about the gold standard. And I’m not sure there’s enough time left for primary voters to lose interest in Paul before the Iowa caucuses. What happens if Ron Paul wins the Iowa caucuses? Probably not much, honestly. Winning the Iowa caucuses has been a noisy indicator in Iowa, especially for the Republicans. In 2008 Huckabee won, and in 1996 and 1988 Bob Dole won. None of them ended up being the Republican nominee, obviously. In 2008 John McCain came in fourth, behind some guy called Fred Thompson, and still won the nomination overall. And I can’t imagine Fox News being like “oh hey Ron Paul won let’s all throw our support behind him” like they might for, say, Perry. Anyway, this has kind of motivated me to put up more 2012 US general election prediction maps after I’m done with this last paper. I think I’ll do Obama vs Romney, Gingrich, and Paul. (An unsurprising preview: Newtmania is not currently sweeping the nation.)

Okay so America’s favourite charming stoner racist great-uncle is apparently leading in Iowa, according to Public Policy Polling. While obviously it’s not productive to read too much into any individual poll, PPP polls extensively in Iowa, and in the past they’ve produced excellent results, and these shifts in poll results (especially the drop for Gingrich) are hugely statistically significant.

I’m guessing the drop for Gingrich comes from the fact that as primary voters learn more about him (and his multiplicity of wives) they are less impressed by his ability to return the United States to some mythical glorious pre-Mad Man era patriarchal Christian paradise. This has kind of been a pretty steady pattern throughout the campaign process: voters identify a candidate who seems promisingly conservative and personable, they learn more about the candidate’s past and priorities through increased media scrutiny, and they realize the candidate is undesirable. It’s happened for Bachmann, Perry, Cain, and now Gingrich.

Anyway, apparently they’re going through the same process for Paul, at least in Iowa. Media coverage of the Paul campaign tends to depict it as some kind of wacky sideshow, but his local-level campaigning has apparently been really effective in Iowa. I think when he focuses on restricting abortions, removing restrictions on gun ownership, and removing social spending, it makes him really attractive to Republican primary voters - as they’re probably more motivated by these issues than esoteric concerns about the gold standard. And I’m not sure there’s enough time left for primary voters to lose interest in Paul before the Iowa caucuses.

What happens if Ron Paul wins the Iowa caucuses? Probably not much, honestly. Winning the Iowa caucuses has been a noisy indicator in Iowa, especially for the Republicans. In 2008 Huckabee won, and in 1996 and 1988 Bob Dole won. None of them ended up being the Republican nominee, obviously. In 2008 John McCain came in fourth, behind some guy called Fred Thompson, and still won the nomination overall. And I can’t imagine Fox News being like “oh hey Ron Paul won let’s all throw our support behind him” like they might for, say, Perry.

Anyway, this has kind of motivated me to put up more 2012 US general election prediction maps after I’m done with this last paper. I think I’ll do Obama vs Romney, Gingrich, and Paul. (An unsurprising preview: Newtmania is not currently sweeping the nation.)

17 notes

Dec 11 2011 ∞
“ Since 2008, it’s become clear to us in this room that democracy is an inadequate means of determining economic policy in a functioning capitalist society. For capitalism to survive, our nation will ultimately need to shift to a system where the rules are set not by Congress, but by those of us who understand how a market economy really works.
— Ben Bernanke, Chair of the Federal Reserve, in his remarks as keynote speaker at the 2011 Goldman Sachs Winter Holiday Party. Well then.

(Source: bit.ly)

74 notes

Dec 10 2011 ∞

Russians Rally in Biggest Nationwide Protests Against Putin

These are some pretty impressive demonstrations. Hundreds of thousands of people are protesting in Moscow - protesting outdoors, in December, in Moscow, so you know these are serious grievances. The current protests are the largest since the Soviet Union was collapsing. I’m not sure they really represent any threat to Putin’s rule, but it’s a pretty clear signal that sham elections like last week’s aren’t going to fly in Russia anymore.

I think most people were willing to accept the relatively-incompetent authoritarian government as long as living standards kept rising - but Russia’s economy was hit badly in the 2008 crash and has been slow to recover. If everyone’s getting steadily poorer under your rule, they’re a lot less likely to be okay with you rigging elections and disappearing journalists and suppressing all dissent.

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